The Asymmetry in AI Use Between Tax Authorities and Taxpayers in Transfer Pricing Defense

A recent Tax Notes article on a Turkish transfer pricing case traces the dispute through to its downstream effect on a U.S. foreign tax credit claim. In doing so, it sets out an asymmetry that deserves more attention in transfer pricing practice: Turkey regulates how professional advisors may use generative AI in giving tax advice, but places no comparable constraint on its own tax administration's use of machine analysis for risk-scoring, flagging related-party anomalies, or selecting cases for audit. The rules on the taxpayer side are specific and restrictive. The rules on the authority side are largely unwritten.

The same week the Turkey piece appeared, a Manila-based practitioner column described how the Philippines' Bureau of Internal Revenue has operationalised a system-assisted, risk-based audit selection framework under Revenue Memorandum Order 1-2026. The indicators are aimed squarely at related-party transactions: persistent losses against strong revenue, tax-to-sales ratios that look too low, and heavy reliance on a single related counterparty. Under this framework, transfer pricing risk is pre-flagged by the system before an examiner opens the file. Read together with Turkey's dual posture, restrictive on taxpayer-side AI reliance and expansive on authority-side machine analysis, the two examples suggest the asymmetry is not confined to one jurisdiction.

The same question arises for anyone advising Indian multinationals or GCCs. India's safe harbour election process is moving toward an automated, rules-based model, CBDT's compliance apparatus already uses AI-assisted risk profiling, and the APA and audit infrastructure is becoming steadily more analytics-driven. All of this sits on the authority side of the same asymmetry described in the Turkish and Philippine examples. Several Big 4 and boutique TP technology vendors have published material this year describing increased use of generative AI in preparing local files, benchmarking memoranda, and functional analyses. Whether that assistance will be treated on the same footing as a signed opinion from a human expert, when the question becomes whether a position was taken in good faith or whether a reasonable-cause defence survives scrutiny, is not yet settled by any rule or ruling in India.

The Turkish case does not resolve this question. Its value lies in naming the gap explicitly, rather than treating AI in tax administration as a single undifferentiated trend of efficiency gains for everyone. Whether the standards governing reliance, documentation, and reasonable cause will develop in step for both tax authorities and taxpayers, or whether taxpayers will end up defending AI-informed positions against AI-generated risk scores under rules drafted for one-sided use, remains open.

For Indian practitioners, the practical implication is to document how AI tools are used in preparing local files, benchmarking analyses, and functional analyses now, before the question is tested in audit or litigation, so that the basis for any position can be explained and defended independently of the tool used to generate it.

When the Service Provider Is an Algorithm: What Chapter VII's AI Problem Means for Indian Captives

A captive Indian entity, such as a GCC, a KPO, or a testing centre like the one at the heart of the Honda R&D India ruling this month, performs a defined function for its overseas parent. The transfer pricing analysis asks three questions: whether a service was rendered, whether the recipient derived a benefit, and what cost-plus markup reflects an arm's length charge for that service.

This is the architecture of Chapter VII of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and it underlies most of India's Safe Harbour Rules, most APAs for ITES/BPO structures, and a large share of the ITAT docket. It works cleanly as long as the item being delivered is recognisably a service: bounded, routine, and separable from any underlying intangible.

In June 2026, the OECD's Working Party 6 released a discussion draft proposing a substantive rewrite of Chapter VII, including a new accurate-delineation analysis, an expanded benefit test, a sharper shareholder/stewardship distinction, and new guidance on the boundary between a service and an intangible. Comments closed on 22 July, and the OECD published the full set of responses on 24 August: more than one hundred submissions from businesses, industry bodies, and advisory firms.

A recurring theme across those submissions was a call for clearer distinctions between intra-group services and intangible transfers, particularly for AI-enabled and digital service models. This suggests that practitioners find the existing framework difficult to apply to AI-delivered outputs, a chapter otherwise treated as settled doctrine since the 1990s.

The captive/GCC model is central to India's transfer pricing practice, not a peripheral segment of it. Thousands of Indian entities are remunerated on a cost-plus basis for the kind of routine, human-performed functions that Chapter VII was built to price: testing, market research, back-office processing, and KPO analytics. Many of these entities are, in 2026, incorporating agentic AI into the delivery of these functions, which changes what sits inside the service line item rather than replacing it.

If a GCC's cost-plus-remunerated data analytics service is increasingly produced by an AI agent trained on group data, proprietary models, or a parent's algorithms, the question is whether the Indian entity is still delivering a 'service' in the Chapter VII sense, or something closer to an output derived from an intangible it does not own. That distinction could imply a different pricing method, a different DEMPE analysis, and possibly disqualification from the Safe Harbour margins (now consolidated into the unified 15.5% IT Services band) that assume a routine, low-risk service function.

Two other developments this week bear on the same issue. Turkey's Tax Inspection Board launched an AI system in August built specifically to flag transfer pricing risk in related-party transactions, which suggests some revenue authorities are building AI capability aimed at this kind of transaction. On the advisory side, Nexdigm's alliance with the AI-native TP platform infer360 shows Indian mid-tier firms building AI-TP capability of their own, partly in anticipation of this characterisation issue becoming a live audit question rather than an academic one.

Whether the CBDT should clarify, before the 2027 filing season, whether AI-enabled service delivery inside a GCC/ITES structure remains within the Safe Harbour and cost-plus framework, or whether it needs a separate carve-out, is a question worth raising now. The Chapter VII revision will not be finalised until after the November 2026 Paris consultation, so India has a window to shape its own domestic position rather than import whatever the OECD eventually adopts.

Given how much of India's outbound service economy sits on this fault line, practitioners advising GCC and ITES clients would do well to flag the characterisation risk in current TP documentation, ahead of any assessment order that forces the issue.

Agentic AI in Transfer Pricing: The Practical Problem Is the Handoff Between Agents

Discussion of AI and transfer pricing has largely centred on whether a single autonomous agent could take a set of intercompany agreements, run a functional analysis, select comparables and produce a defensible benchmarking range with minimal human involvement. Vendors market toward that capability, and practitioner panels debate whether such an agent could meet the reliability standards implicit in Section 92C or Section 482. A hackathon held in Vienna earlier this year, organised with the WU Tax Law Technology Center, Microsoft and TPA Global and reported only this week, points to a different pattern taking shape in practice. Rather than building one model to perform the entire task, participating teams chained together several narrower agents, each handling a bounded function.

The case studies covered intra-group financing and intercompany services: arm's length interest rates, creditworthiness assessment, the benefit test, cost allocation, method selection and documentation. Teams built separate agents for data extraction, service classification, benefit testing, cost allocation, compliance monitoring, documentation and audit readiness, and linked them into a workflow. The organisers were explicit that the intent is not to replace professional judgment: outputs are meant to remain traceable to source, reviewed before use, and subject to human oversight at each step. This combination of decomposition and human-in-the-loop review appears to be the practical model emerging from the exercise, even as vendor marketing continues to emphasise single-agent capability.

This distinction matters for Indian TP practice because the architecture of contemporaneous documentation, under Rule 10D, the erstwhile Form 3CEB and now Form 48 under the 2025 Act, assumes a single preparer's judgment trail. A TPO can ask why a particular comparable was included and expect an answer from one analyst or one firm. A pipeline of five narrow agents does not fit that assumption. If a data-extraction agent misclassifies a transaction, a downstream benefit-test agent may inherit that error and proceed regardless, since it is not designed to question upstream inputs, only to execute its own task. The more likely failure mode in a multi-agent TP workflow is not a single agent producing a wrong answer, but an error propagating silently across a handoff that no one is specifically assigned to audit. India's TP documentation requirements, safe harbour disclosures and APA application forms do not currently address this scenario; they assume one preparer whose competence and good faith can be tested under cross-examination or TPO scrutiny.

Practitioners, and possibly CBDT, will need to consider what a chain-of-custody requirement for multi-agent TP work product should look like before a dispute forces the issue. Knowing that a benchmarking output traces back to a database source, as most current vendor claims are framed, is not sufficient. It would also require knowing which agent touched the data at each stage, what it changed or flagged, and whether a human actually reviewed the boundary between two agents' work rather than only the final output. India is already working through related questions, such as how DEMPE functions performed by AI systems fit within the intangibles framework, and whether GCC functional segmentation holds up against agentic AI restructuring inside captive centres. The handoff-audit issue sits a level below those debates: it concerns not whether AI can perform a TP function defensibly, but whether anyone can reconstruct, after the fact, which of several AI agents was responsible when something went wrong. Given how current documentation standards are framed, that question is more likely to surface first in a TPO's show-cause notice than in a policy paper, and practitioners relying on multi-agent tools would do well to build their own audit trail across agent handoffs before that happens.

India's New GCC Benchmarking Advice Meets an Agentic AI Problem It Has Not Addressed

For several years, the standard defensive approach for a captive Global Capability Centre (GCC) facing an Indian Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) has been fairly mechanical: apply TNMM on an operating cost base, benchmark against routine service-provider comparables, and settle within the accepted cost-plus range. A jurisdiction briefing circulated this week for International Tax Review describes FY2025-26 as a year in which TPO scrutiny of GCC margins and intra-group services intensified, with officers moving toward fewer but deeper adjustments. The advisory response is to segment the GCC into three separately tested activities, namely support, delivery, and decision-rights, with each priced on its own terms rather than blended into a single entity-level margin.

This approach aligns with the OECD's current work at the multilateral level. The OECD has published the full set of public comments on its proposed rewrite of Chapter VII, which governs intra-group services, ahead of a consultation meeting scheduled for November in Paris. Practitioner submissions describe the draft as a substantive rewrite rather than a tidy-up: it requires accurate delineation of what was actually done, by whom, and under what conduct, as the necessary first step before any pricing method is chosen, and it expands the benefit test that has long been the fault line in service fee disputes. Read together, the Indian advisory and the OECD draft point in the same direction: MNEs are being asked to stop pricing services as a single blended category and instead demonstrate, activity by activity, that a real economic function occurred and that an independent party would have paid for it.

This advice may be harder to execute than it appears, not because of documentation gaps in the traditional sense but because of a shift underway in how GCCs operate. India's GCCs are moving away from task-by-task human execution toward agentic AI systems that plan and execute multi-step workflows autonomously. Industry commentary has described Google's move from single-task AI assistants to an agent platform that can be deployed, supervised, and audited across a company's systems as a development that could affect the labour-arbitrage economics on which the GCC sector was built. Separately, EY's GCC survey work finds a large majority of centres already testing agentic technology, with over half piloting agent-based systems specifically. Inside a GCC, this means a workflow once visibly split between a junior analyst performing support work and a senior lead exercising decision-rights judgment can now be executed end-to-end by a single agent, or by a human-agent pair, in a manner not observable from outside the system the way an organisation chart or job description made it observable five years ago.

The Indian TP advisory recommends segmenting the GCC into three tested activities before benchmarking. The OECD requires accurate delineation of the transaction before pricing it. Both instructions assume a documentable boundary between routine support and higher-value decision-making that a TPO or comparability analyst can observe and test. Agentic AI does not necessarily respect that boundary. If an exception-handling agent inside a GCC performs functions that combine what used to be tier-1 support and tier-2 judgment, the functional analysis section of the Local File, which describes who does what, would either need to become considerably more granular about which agent or human made a given call, or risk reverting to the blended, entity-level treatment that both the OECD and Indian practice are trying to move away from.

The practical question is not whether AI adoption in GCCs is occurring; the survey data and industry commentary indicate that it is. It is whether the functional-segmentation and accurate-delineation frameworks currently being refined by the OECD and recommended by Indian advisors were designed for a labour model that may be changing faster than the guidance can be finalised. If accurate delineation depends on establishing what was actually done and by whom, and 'whom' increasingly means a shifting combination of humans and autonomous agents operating across functional boundaries that were previously organisationally distinct, this raises a documentation question that neither the OECD's November consultation agenda nor the Indian safe harbour and Local File templates currently address in detail. For practitioners, the practical implication is to start building functional analyses capable of tracking agent-level activity now, rather than waiting for the guidance to catch up.

AI-Performed DEMPE Functions and the Limits of Transfer Pricing's Intangibles Framework

The OECD's DEMPE framework was designed to stop groups from parking valuable intangibles in a low-tax entity that holds legal title but performs none of the underlying work. The test traces the relevant functions, development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation, back to the people who exercise judgment over them: who decided to pursue a research direction, who approved a patent filing, who manages commercialisation risk. For two decades this test has worked reasonably well because those functions were, in fact, performed by identifiable people.

That assumption is being tested where AI systems perform DEMPE functions. Commentary in Australia has raised this issue in relation to the ATO's Practical Compliance Guideline 2024/1 on intangibles migration, which requires multinationals to self-assess and disclose where DEMPE activities for offshore-held intangibles actually occur, using a risk-zone framework that determines how closely the ATO will scrutinise a taxpayer's position. The commentary notes that the PCG's evidence requirements assume human decision-makers, leaving a gap where AI systems (training models, tuning algorithms, monitoring outputs, iterating on protection measures) perform these functions without a person who can be identified as the locus of judgment.

A companion piece extends this analysis to M&A due diligence. It argues that AI systems, including the algorithms, training data and infrastructure, are themselves valuable intangibles under transfer pricing principles, and that a target lacking DEMPE documentation for its AI footprint may carry dormant tax risk that an acquirer inherits on completion.

This is not confined to Australia, and it is not a distant issue for India. India's global capability centre sector has moved well beyond routine coding and support work. Commentary directed at India's GCC market has told clients that where a captive centre designs a core AI algorithm used across the global group, arm's-length pricing cannot be justified by comparing developer hourly rates; the pricing must reflect that creative, value-creating contribution. That is a DEMPE argument, framed in language close to the ATO's, applied to the kind of AI-first GCC that has become common in Bengaluru, Hyderabad and Pune over the last two years.

The timing adds to the difficulty. The Finance Act 2026 safe-harbour rationalisation consolidated software, ITeS, KPO and contract R&D into a single IT-services category, set a flat 15.5% margin, and raised the eligible transaction threshold to ₹2,000 crore. The change was presented as compliance simplification for routine captive units. A captive unit whose engineers are training or fine-tuning a model whose commercial exploitation happens offshore may not be 'routine' in the DEMPE sense, even if it fits comfortably within the new safe-harbour band. A group that elects into the safe harbour for five years on the strength of a routine cost-plus characterisation may be locking in a margin that a DEMPE-consistent functional analysis would not support. That exposure may surface only when the safe-harbour election lapses and a TPO examines what the unit was actually doing.

This raises a harder question about the DEMPE test itself. DEMPE and the 'significant people functions' concept exist to identify who exercises judgment over value creation. Where that judgment is distributed across a model's training run, a human supervisor who approves outputs in bulk, and an infrastructure team in a different jurisdiction, none of these resembles the risk-bearing decision-maker the framework was written for. Tribunals and tax authorities have decades of practice tracing DEMPE to people, but little developed practice for tracing it to a system.

Whether CBDT, the ITAT or the OECD develops a workable answer first, and whether India follows the ATO's disclosure-and-self-assessment approach or adopts something more prescriptive, remains unclear. For now, practitioners advising GCCs and AI-heavy captives should treat DEMPE documentation for AI-performed functions as a present compliance issue, and should examine whether a safe-harbour election understates the functional profile of a unit that is doing more than routine service delivery.